The cll8rildefilbe !!>;II o;IaIine5 indepeoderll schOOl d'SlficlS is their al)il~y 10 ral " '~lI05 alllOnomously. T haI ~, 1!>eI, abi6Iy 10 MCUI9 lura lor e<:Iucalion independem 01 IIle _'e1iorJs 01 01het eoo,opeIioog muniapaI seMces.' This aIliIOly rTolY Include 1he estaIJIi&hment 01 tao: ,ales 00 a respec1Mil tao: lIMe, a_en\. and 1he tubsequo.wII cotec1ioo mille p";.;eG ,' In distrids ""'en nava ;'odege< o:.1enI tao:rog 8IMIotiIy. !he propet1y "'" accoun1S lor more !han 80% 01 !he local _n ... s.' AddIDIal)'. in _81 staleS il is lila sole til. base upon wNch districts may levy ' Acoordnt/Y. In 198&-89. independenl school distrids OO!8oine<l 97% oA their local tax r-...e ffllm \he P<O!looy In. ' The 900i'08 oA IOeIII lund~ 10.-dependent sd!OO diSlficIS is allen leil dear. I'\OWeYer, As OOled, these dislricls rely 00 approprietion$ f""m thO lOcal mooicipalily, which may Ilave in seidl1iorJ to the property tax, other taxing and assessment mecnanisms, Among Ihele are local sale taxes , occupation ta.el , motor VGhicle Ilcensel"s. ","""ral extraction and !lev.".anoe ta.os, irI1_,Inoome. and procoo<Is from coon tinO»-.~, OOcallH p~ ""'" ara !he single """t TI>e abov" statement, wrinen by tax exl>"'1 E.R .A. ~~ man over seven decades a~, reveals the senlime nt IiI lt by thQ majority of taxpaye<s thrOU\tlO!Jt the century. " What accounts for sllCh widespread dlsutislac!ion? One '" the primary eriU· cisms of the ~se 01 the prope rty tax is the potentia l tor ttr& medlanism 10 'r'ioIate I\n::Iamental p,rrclples 01 taxpaye.-&q~it\I,
Adam Smi1h
WfOIe e~1y abo\l1 whal is required 10 make a laX~ 1M &ubje<:ts 01 .VIOI)' sfale ovghI kJ carlriOtrle fO.
wam, 111#1 $uppOfI 0I1t1e lJO'I"iII"'II as ~ as pt» ..,.. In proponiorr kJ /heir r8$pfJC/iVe abiNties; mal 14, lhat need to be mat n Ofde< for a system or fa'-atioo 10 ac!Iieve eQUiIy, SrrUIIl asserts that lIle burden 01 fa"-lion ShOuld be born In prOj)Ol1ion 10 one's "respective ai);';tieI-(ability 10 pay pr1ndple), arw:! also in propMiO<'1 to thQ I9venue one -enjoys ~noe r the prOleCtiO<' 1 01 the state" (OOoo!i! prirq>le). Although Sm ith a rg ues that an "eq uitable" system 01 taxation would encompass both 01 these tr)r"lets, upon closer e><9roj.,.
tictl ~ pri~ I ,e fa , from COfT1)Ieroonlary.
-"., Benilfw Pri<r::i/H: T,,-tren.l~ princ", • • sans, ttrat resources. from what....,." 90UrCe de<I¥ed. within a glven tme l rarne. COOS<Jmption ba""" measures are tounded 00 the premisG that th ose who -consume-more. I ,e OOtte r able to pay than those who oonsume leU. And lastly , wtlahh b-asad mea-I U'es seek to determin e a n ind i.idu ai's wher~wi tha l to pay basad """" the '\latus-01 the ,esources they possess al the time 0/ assessment, Irrespe<:tiv<l 01 tlla mta ..... 01 abi lity employed. contribution is 10 be dlttetmlr>ell '" ~ with the t_t5 01 horizontat and _enlc. 6YSIem emptoy a suitable mean. lor det""*'lng (1M'S ability to pay7 For at least the loIow'I'g three 19a9Ol'l5. the ans_r is roo 1 Inacrof'8/6 Definition aI Wean": The proparty laX system seeks to assess an Indr>Odua l's wherewithat 10 pay based upon the;'-"wGatth", However, tl>e term wealth in th is context is milllmldlng, The ta. is r,riversaly applied to the aSS&ssed fal , ma,ket . a l"" of aM r.on-e.empt realty .~ Ttus the property tax 8)'S1en\ wilen o:isalkms \he deduction oj labitilies 8fId excludes potSOOIII prOJ>' 1Kty, securities. and dep05its. does net 1tOCUf31e/y ....
IIoct the more inctusiwl ~t beS9<I """"""'II '" "net 'NDftIi".-Rather. the tu.1OQQ toIety to """ ~ 01 an -. a f s holdings 10 ...... 118 his 0' I>er ability 10 pay" Comi(ler the toIoIoIng: Att . . being """",,, two inmIiduaIs. A and B. boIh 0*Tl ldenticat parcels 01 ",at property Yatued a~ S tOO.OOO each. Additionally . A owns Ihe p roperty Ir" and clear . white B has a StOO.OOO rrrortgage 0<'1 Mis respectiv9 paroet. Therefore, A has ~ net wortn 01 $t 00.000, while B lias a ""I worth of $0 ($100,000 uset -$tOO.OOO liat>il ity .. $0 net WO!t!1), As property tax system pre$fl n~y functioros , how-ever, boIh A and 8's abil ity-to-pay wil l be determiMd \0 be equal ($100,000) . Accordingy, they wi be assessed equal levies. Conversely, I the property tax system mea· su red an irdvdual's nel ~h, A, whose worth is higher, w(}\Jld be lev ied a n in creased amount commens urate w ith his holdings. Therefore, ;" this ex a~e , un equals are treated equally. Tl>Js, ~ one stbscrtbes to the cencept of r>e( """'h as a mo re representaWe measure 0/ a n itY;t;viduars "wealth", the property tax system is ;" violation of the principle 01 vertical equ ity 2. £"'ments of a Regressive Incidence: A secOO<! widely e spoused criticism of the property tax, as a measure of ooe's ability to pay, is that the tax i$ regressive." Thai is, lowe r income taxpayers w il pay a hig he r percentage 0/ their irx:ome to satisfy property taxes than highe r in· come taxpayers. II this assMioro is tn .
• ' , it t>rinQs into q uestion Itie effICaCY 01 the property tax as a means to secure pub lic support. This long-stan ding assertion.
te rmed too traditiooal view 01 property tax incide nce, has, however, come into Questioo. In , Wh o Pays the P'OpfJrty Tax, a d iscou r ... o n property tax irICidence, Aa ron demonstrate s that in many ways the tax ca n have a progressive enect 00 taxj>ayer incidence. Thus, the true nature of property·s tax incidence is slill subject to questio n. ~ 3. tniquid Nature 01 Real Properry WeaUh: A third criticism of the use of "wealth" as a measur(l 01 a bil ity to pay c ooters on the l iquid nature of rea l property. Taxation req uires the tra nsfer 01 resources Irom the tal<payer to the publ" secto r. The refore, a taxpayer mvsl have sui· f"ie nt liq uid reSouI'WS available, or conve rt p rope rty hQldings into cu rre ncy or other negotiallie instruments.
in order to hooor his or he r obI;gation. Clea rly, the notion of disposif1\l 01 I'M'S mal property to sati sfy tax liabilities Os rather disturbing to ma ny taxpayers.
All men are created equal. B ut, a re they treated equally?
The re mainder 01 this article exam ines both t he public and prival\) S<lctor responses to the perceived failure of the prope rty tax system to accurately measure one's aMty to pay tit. The Pub lic Sector Response-Targeted Tax Relief Property tax relief inc ludes a mel ange of mechanisms designed to Wm it re lia nce o n the tax to secu re local reSO<Jrces. These mechani sms m ay be grouped into two broad categ()l"ies; gene ra l a nd targeted. General relief atte m pts to iod iscrim ;' natety lowe r property ta, es fQr al classes of prope rty. This may t>e accomplished by implementing one, or any oorni::< natioro, 01 the following progra ms :"
• Increased state aid (e.g .·schoo fina nce "<I'Jalizatioro pro.
grams at the state level)" • Assu m pt io ns of loca l lunctions by s tate g over nm e nt (e .g.·schoof d istrict transportatio n) • tncreased local sales and ir>eome taxes or user cha rges" ' T~x and spending l imita ti on s ( e.g .-teg islative co nstraints 00 school d istrict expen d it ures )~ Ge ne ral tax re lie l is designed to reduce taxes across all classes 01 property types a nd owners. Acco rding ly. it does nol d iractly addres s the p roperty tax in relation to an indilfidual's ability to pay, the refore it "i ll not be fu rther exam ined . In Con· trast to ge neral re lief, targeted re lief reduces p roperty taxes l or ooly a select g ro up 01 ta'payers, generally owne rs 01 residential o r agr"ultural property. Th ere a re two methocls 01 providing relief in this category;"
• Homeslead cmdits Or exe mptions • Circuit brIlakers Homestead exe mpllons and circuit breaker prog rams a re designed to give rel iet to taxpaye rs w ith in tMe same class. Accord ingy, ta rgeted tax re~ef is the pubtic $&ClOts responSG 10 the proparty tax's a lleged inab ility to accurately assess oo e's ab, ity to pay.
HomeSlead Exemptions and Circuit Brea kers
A homestead exemptioo. 0 00 of tOO oldest property tal< m· iel mechan isms , seeks to reduce tile p roperty tax lor a specitic class 01 taxpayers w ho own homes. For ex a~e Montana provides a hom estead credit for in dividuals, 62 yea rs or ol der, equal to property taxes paid, less some specified amou nt based 00 income . Other states see+; to reduce the assessed valuatioo 01 property for specil" classes 01 taxpayers (e.g.-elderiy) . The result, regardtess o! the means, is tMt the ta' bi ll 01 the respective "homestead taxpayer" ls reduced. Although some states re· imburse loca l governments lOr the revenue losses ca used by the homestead credit. more COr'l\'TlOOly too cost is oome by too local unil, or more accurately thG local ine ligible taxpayer.
C ircuit bmake rs dGrive l he ir nama Irom the fol o;o,ing aMlOIlY. They (ci r""t i>reakers) am desig ned to protect a ta><payer againsl property tax "overload" in the same manne r an e lectr>::af circuit breaker protects a power line again st an ove rload 0/ current. OverlOad may be the result of a drop in cu rrent year income d ue to ill ness, unemployment, or other e><traordinaIY circumstances. Ovettoad may also be the result o! a d rop in ;,,-rome due to retire ment. As such, in the latte r case , over1oad wil l not likely be m itigated by future increases in income.
Circuit breakers provide payments to ta'payers, usua lly in the form of income tax credits, eq ual to lhe e,cess residentia l property ta, liabilities over a designate<i percentage 01 inoom9. 
Prope rty Tsx Circuit Breaker
Credit.-A resident irdviduaf, who oocupies the same residenoe lor at least six months and wtxlse househofd gross income is $18,000 or less for the tax year, gets this credit It is given in the maximum amoont of $75, $375 for persons age 65 or older, lor the l irst $ t ,000 of ho usehofd gross income. and down $2 , o r $t7 for the e lde rly, lo r eveIY add itiooal $1,000, to 54 t , ()I" S86 fo r the elderly, fo r ho useho id income over $17.000 b ut not over $ 18,000. Croot re prese nts a fraction 0I1tie excess property ta>:6S.
An owner 01 a home valued at $85.000 for property tal<a' lion, a t~n ant whose adjusted monthty rent is S450 00 av· e rage, and homes e xempt l rom prope rty tax do not quality."
In 1989, some type of circu it b re ake r prog ram or homestead cred it were employed in 3t and 40 states, respect i vely .~ (Soo Table 3 ) Th e g reat d isparities in circuit breaker and home· stead plans reflects the diversity Qf their objectives. Among 1M most c ommon objectives of the meohanisms' p roponents are the lollowing :'"
• Th e programs can d ecrease the reg r~ssi-ve nat"", at the property tax • The mechan isms oan op"rate as an ind irect l orm 01 rev· er'MJe sha ri ng il the losses a re linanced by the state.
• Targeted reliel can protect Iow· income taxpayers with unusual ly large liab ilit ies or w ith temp o ra ry d ep ressed incomes.
• And , since oonelits often aoc ru e to largely Iow-it1C<)tne ho use hold s, they c a n be su pported by advocates of greater income redistributioo as an in te ri m device until la rger we lfare i>'ograms can be enacted.
• By rebating or cred iting taxes, circuit i>reakers and nome--stead cred its ca n a llow th e alde rly, who freq uently have paid off a ll mortgages a nd expari ence no oot·ol ·pock.t costs Olher than mainlenance and p roperty taxes, to ra· ma;";,, the ir homes.
As notad, the programs differ wide~ in their strucwre, arid accordingly, in their intentioos with regard to the above objectives. O>e rnortgag<I may alsO provide tor a fixed or ... "'!rb19 int"'"t rate," The Pfi ma.,. adva ntago 01 tllese instru , ments, with rG'}a rd (0 (00 landol r, r<>Sts in the provision that tile inr:;tltution wi l be pra.ecled by tile HUD .... ur· an:e 16;llUra 14> 10 the "ma><imurn d aim amounr. """" f !he ban', oots1anding ~nQII exoeeds 1fIf ... IUII ot the ptI)I)8t1V on !he dalll 0I ..... ~ In this cas.. HUD Will repay !Ioe lenders for any da.fic;eocy oot 01 the rMfl· !l8'>I' insuranC<l p"'m i~ms (~IP) pte.io~~y CQllacted ~ndo ' the terms of the HECM loan" AcwrdingIy, pro· vided the t>orrowers occupy the home as the<r Pf""'ipal residooce. they cannoI be torced 10 $&II the hom8 10 salisty 1l1li mor1gage. even • 1l1li ll8lue 01 the property is less 1I\an Ih& outstaodrng tIilIance 01 the OOlrgation.~ ThoreIofe. wrIh ""13Id ( origination lee 10< arranQing !he mortgage, These le<ls are """,,,ally exp ressed as a percer1tage of the home'$ value Or the amount 01 equ'ty being mo'(989ed" Insured tenders -. charge rill< premi.ms from 2'J(, 10 7% 01 !he Il00 ... ·5 orakJe li1<e pornl!; on a tradol>Qr\lll monga9f. the premiu","" are ~h.fOOO upOn ori9"\'" lion." Some Iende<s aM cnarge a monthly insuranoB pr~ to the borrowe ' (0 CQ'>'9r risk· r~la llKi ()()$~, In ar;Idition (0 the fees ch8 ' (/iid by thG lend ing Inst rtution, the toorrowe' must also accoonl for ()!h .... third Pi'ny costs associated wiIh a traoster 01 ,~,tial rear property. For example. the h~ is responsible (0< appraisalS. bdll searoll and iflS1;ran~e. 1nspeC(rons. reootding , -, 5efVidng leM, and any otller p<oles· sional costs suc h as acoounlanl s and al lorn eys fees Mosl lending i nsti tut~ ", II arrar>ge to hav .. thew fOO$ added to the balaooe of the obligation . However, although they do nol represent out of pocket ex p~n di tures fe< the t>orrower, they do serve to decreaw they monthly paymenllo lhe oomoowner. 5, Under all obligations inieresl is charged. Therefo re, al· thoul,lh the bC<rowe r e< his estate wit eventually receive a tax deduction for Ihe inl eresl iocurred unde r the arrangement, Ihe resu ltant monlhl y payment is les sened by t h~ int<>resl charged . T hus, !here is a cost 01 l>quidaling the property th at would not be reai ;:ed if 100 property were sold outright. As IXeliiously noted, financial plann~rs are split as to Ihe relative appficability and merit 01 th .. r~v .. rse eq uity mo~gage. Some general reco mme ndatio ns can be made however Uninsured REMs (te rm mo~gages) may 00 usef" to secure in · te""" reSOurces until the oomeowner is eligible 10' pe nsion or social =urity benefits. However, Ihis type of arrangement is not . uitablo for toose who desire 10 rema in in the ir homes . Under insured prog rams, those woo ootli ve l heir actuaria lly pr<'Clete rmined ~fe expocta ncy will benelit. Acoordir>gly, th ose who predec<lase or otherwise vacale e< dispose 01 the IXoperty prior to th .. attainme-nt of the ta rgeted life span estimate are unlikely to realize the ful l yalue of their asset. The latter situatial is a res ult 01 the high costs of origination, w h~h places a disproponiona l amount of cIebI serv"", in the inil ial pe riod . (See Table 4 and 5)
House Rich-Cash Poo r:
The proponents of REMs have 9IWis >oned a populac<:l of -rouse riOO -cas h poor" elderly citize ns. However, upon closer exam inatioo , lhis is not t ruly reflective of the reality 01 the aged MOSl low-income elderly have very littlo housin g wealth, One can see that hoosing weaRh and income am (jrectly reiatoo. Fu~her, Social Secu rity and pensial oonefits am by far lhe most i~nt ~ts 01 wealth lor mosl elderly, The median SS and pensio n wealth lor houseookjs 'hith heads in the 65-70 range is $11 3.4 thousand (presenl value) while the median liquid wealth is ~1 0.0 lhousand and lhe median musing wealth is ooiy $38,0 thousand" T hus the e.amples 01 REM distributions (Table 4) . which we re based on $100,()()() of musing eqtily is not refleclive of th e propMy wealth 01 the vast majorily of efderly homeowners, Accord ingly , lhe tl1C4'Ilhly advaooes are unli kely to significantly improve the sta nd ard 01 ~ving for the low-ilccme, low housing equity e1derly (See Table 6 ).
The demand for REM" has been W milOO, This may be 100 result 01 the pub lio's pe rception t hat the mo~gage$ are too costly (l ees and inlerest), As noted above, ~ may ~k ely be lhe resul l that fami lies thaI have low ir>eoroos from other sou rces, aiM have low hoosi ng equi ty.~ Or, il may be that seniors are unde rstand ably re lu cta nt to touch the equ ity nest egg" thoy I.we taken lheir enl ire ~ves to bui kJ. Rega,dless 01100 cause , REM. have been mel wilh i ltle public suppo~, as e'o'idenced by only 12,000 HECMs being originated silce 1987." Therelore, as \.,;th the pWfic sector's rosponse , th e efficacy 01 the private sectors implementation of AEMs to address the problems inherent in the property tax system abil ity to asooSs one's ability to pay, is also q""stionable. Tho reality is thai mostlow.jncome
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elderly have very little housing wealth. Accordi ngly , toose wI>::l are mostl il<ely in need of ir>eoroo suppo~ do r>01 have too equity to liquidate.
Section V. Implications tor PoliCY Makers
Targeted tax relief has converted the property tax s)'Stem from one that assesses ab ility-to-pay based on a measu re 01 wealth, to one that measu res this abi lity based upon a hybrid 01 irlcome and wealth. T he res ult is that both homostead exemptions an d circuit breakers create oo,izontal in~q uiti as. Thai is, e~gib-kl arid ineligible ta.payers, ",th comparable ookings, are oot treated <>q u~l ly, T his res-u lt. oowever. is wei hidden in the inhe rent complaxilics of, and inleractials between, the varioos taxi ng mechanisms, Circuit breake rs arid homestead exemptions are oot dire<:lly Si.Jbl racled Irom the tax bi ll. Acoordingly, most taxpayers fail to S<le l he conr>ection between the re lief medanism and the reduction of the prope~y tax liability lor a given homeowner. F u~h e r , sine<> Ihe re lief is granted 00 the state level, local units are oIten unable 10 d(ffive the overall effeet the mechanisms have on their community, namely inelig ibie taxpaye rs. Should states get 001 of th e business 01 ta'geted ta" re~el? The answer relies on ono'. pe rceplio n of the role of stale gove rnments in the redistri biJlion ot resourwS and an assessment of their efficacy in doing so.
Alt~ much has been written reg ardi ng tho rodistri lJ.ution 01 wea lth f rom both an eccoomic and mOfal perspectiYe, it soon i:>ecomes evide nt thai the issue is iargely encollChed in OM'S personal view poi nt. II one fal'Ors distributialal r><>icles, targeted tax relief mechanis ms have been somewhat effective in iooreasing iI"Icorne equa~ly " If, however. ooe does not support the impleroontatioo 01 such programs, the avenue of le-g· islative repeal may prove a troobieoome course. For example, SOO1e p;>fitical lheo rists al<>g9 that the comple.ity 01 the existing system of taxation i. th e resu lt Of -s u»port maximizing poI iticians-, who attempt to provkle tax t>enefits to eas i y idenufiable interest groups 'hithout ganeralirlg significant opposition from othe r gro u ps .~ Accordingly, althoogh the ayerage inelig ibie property taxpayer is un aware of the ex ister.::e 01 propMy ta" reliel mechanisms aoo their impact on his or her pe rSOf1al assessment, the removal of sllCh benefits woukJ likely 00 mel wil h Ihe aflocted party's politioal resistance, In contrast to the targeted tax roIlef granted to ei gible property owners through romestead exem ptions and circuit breakers, the creatiO!1 01 REMs appeared 10 t>e a viable rooans to unlock residential equity, aoo as a resu lt incmase income, for the e1derly taxpayer. Howeyer, as evidenoed, this Yehick! has not only failed 10 IJ.e emb rac<:ld by the public, bul also falls soort iro its attempt to adequalefy add ress the needs of the low~nc(>rT"Je e1derly. Thus, currently, both the ptbfic and IXivate sectors haye be~n unab-kl adeq u a t~y address the inabi ity of the property tax system to accurately assess one's abikly 10 pay.
The US<l 01 th e prope~y ta. to lund oo r public schools was 0!1C<' revered as the comerstO!1e 01 lhe American system of ed· ucation. Howeve<, in a wave of ediJcalion finance refOfm thai altempts to baiance equity in per pup~ fun ding, throogh an expansial of the tax base, 'hith local COOl rol, th e use of the property tax to secure revenues has incmasingly been subject to close r scrutiny. The above diSCO<J rso serve<! 10 provide education poIy make rs with an additional prlfSpective. thai oIlhe taxpayer, in assessing the eflicacy of lhe ut' izatioo 01 the prope rty tax to fund oor public schools. Accordlrq'y, policy makers sooo.Ad r"IOt limillheir analyses solef~ to examinations of equity i.stlOls I'oith r~gmd to students, but alS(). equity as it reiates to taxpayers, As evidenced , both the public and private sectors ha~e failed in the ir response to t he prope rty ta. sySle m's in ability to accuratefy measure one's abi lity to pay, Therefore, ilthe property tax is to contin"" to serve as tho p""ary source of local revenues, additional oorrectiYe meas ure . mu.l be omployed to mitigate the taxpaye"~ .... at msu" unde, Ito! curren! syslem , " sod1 m&.II.5Uf ... are unable to be CI8vISed, 0' mplemented, pubic schoO! syst9/l1S must thGn look to aKG mative lIOUfCas of rev-........ Ie M<;ure Sl4lPO" /I)f tIleir operal""", .., '"
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